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#! /usr/bin/python -tt ##Copyright (C) 2003,2005,2009 Jens B. Jorgensen <jbj1@ultraemail.net> ## ##This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or ##modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License ##as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 ##of the License, or (at your option) any later version. ## ##This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, ##but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of ##MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the ##GNU General Public License for more details. ## ##You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License ##along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software ##Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA. import struct, time, cStringIO, base64, types # We use this so that we can work on python-2.4 and python-2.6, and thus. # use import md5/import sha on the older one and import hashlib on the newer. # Stupid deprecation warnings. # pylint: disable-msg=W0108 # Ignore :W0108: *Lambda may not be necessary* try: import hashlib except ImportError: # Python-2.4.z ... gah! import sha import md5 class hashlib: @staticmethod def new(algo): if algo == 'md5': return md5.new() if algo == 'sha1': return sha.new() raise ValueError, "Bad checksum type" debug = None # Cypher Type Byte # bits 7,6 of the CTB say what kind it is # we only have reserved defined CTB_76_NORMAL = 0x80 CTB_76_NEW = 0xc0 CTB_76_MASK = 0xc0 # CTB packet type, bits 5,4,3,2 CTB_PKTV2_MASK = 0x3c # 1111 - mask for this field CTB_PKT_MASK = 0x3f # 111111 - all the lower bits CTB_PKT_PK_ENC = 1 # 0001 - public-key encrypted session packet CTB_PKT_SIG = 2 # 0010 - signature packet CTB_PKT_SK_ENC = 3 # 0011 - symmetric-key encrypted session packet CTB_PKT_OP_SIG = 4 # 0100 - one-pass signature packet CTB_PKT_SK_CERT = 5 # 0101 - secret-key certificate packet CTB_PKT_PK_CERT = 6 # 0110 - public-key certificate packet CTB_PKT_SK_SUB = 7 # 0111 - secret-key subkey packet CTB_PKT_COMPRESSED = 8 # 1000 - compressed data packet CTB_PKT_ENC = 9 # 1001 - symmetric-key encrypted data packet CTB_PKT_MARKER = 10 # 1010 - marker packet CTB_PKT_LIT = 11 # 1011 - literal data packet CTB_PKT_TRUST = 12 # 1100 - trust packet CTB_PKT_USER_ID = 13 # 1101 - user id packet CTB_PKT_PK_SUB = 14 # 1110 - public subkey packet CTB_PKT_USER_ATTR = 17 # 10001 - user attribute packet CTB_PKT_SYM_ENC_INT = 18 # 10010 - symmetric encrypted integrity packet CTB_PKT_MOD_DETECT = 19 # 10011 - modification detection code packet ctb_pkt_to_str = { CTB_PKT_PK_ENC : 'public-key encrypted session packet', CTB_PKT_SIG : 'signature packet', CTB_PKT_SK_ENC : 'symmetric-key encrypted session packet', CTB_PKT_OP_SIG : 'one-pass signature packet', CTB_PKT_SK_CERT : 'secret-key certificate packet', CTB_PKT_PK_CERT : 'public-key certificate packet', CTB_PKT_SK_SUB : 'secret-key subkey packet', CTB_PKT_COMPRESSED : 'compressed data packet', CTB_PKT_ENC : 'symmetric-key encrypted data packet', CTB_PKT_MARKER : 'marker packet', CTB_PKT_LIT : 'literal data packet', CTB_PKT_TRUST : 'trust packet', CTB_PKT_USER_ID : 'user id packet', CTB_PKT_PK_SUB : 'public subkey packet', CTB_PKT_USER_ATTR : 'user attribute packet', CTB_PKT_SYM_ENC_INT : 'symmetric encrypted integrity packet', CTB_PKT_MOD_DETECT : 'modification detection code packet' } # CTB packet-length CTB_PKT_LEN_MASK = 0x3 # 11 - mask CTB_PKT_LEN_1 = 0 # 00 - 1 byte CTB_PKT_LEN_2 = 1 # 01 - 2 bytes CTB_PKT_LEN_4 = 2 # 10 - 4 bytes CTB_PKT_LEN_UNDEF = 3 # 11 - no packet length supplied # Algorithms # Public Key Algorithms ALGO_PK_RSA_ENC_OR_SIGN = 1 # RSA (Encrypt or Sign) ALGO_PK_RSA_ENC_ONLY = 2 # RSA Encrypt-Only ALGO_PK_RSA_SIGN_ONLY = 3 # RSA Sign-Only ALGO_PK_ELGAMAL_ENC_ONLY = 16 # Elgamal (Encrypt-Only) ALGO_PK_DSA = 17 # DSA (Digital Signature Standard) ALGO_PK_ELLIPTIC_CURVE = 18 # Elliptic Curve ALGO_PK_ECDSA = 19 # ECDSA ALGO_PK_ELGAMAL_ENC_OR_SIGN = 20 # Elgamal (Encrypt or Sign) ALGO_PK_DH = 21 # Diffie-Hellman algo_pk_to_str = { ALGO_PK_RSA_ENC_OR_SIGN : 'RSA (Encrypt or Sign)', ALGO_PK_RSA_ENC_ONLY : 'RSA Encrypt-Only', ALGO_PK_RSA_SIGN_ONLY : 'RSA Sign-Only', ALGO_PK_ELGAMAL_ENC_ONLY : 'Elgamal Encrypt-Only', ALGO_PK_DSA : 'DSA (Digital Signature Standard)', ALGO_PK_ELLIPTIC_CURVE : 'Elliptic Curve', ALGO_PK_ECDSA : 'ECDSA', ALGO_PK_ELGAMAL_ENC_OR_SIGN : 'Elgamal (Encrypt or Sign)', ALGO_PK_DH : 'Diffie-Hellman' } # Symmetric Key Algorithms ALGO_SK_PLAIN = 0 # Plaintext or unencrypted data ALGO_SK_IDEA = 1 # IDEA ALGO_SK_3DES = 2 # Triple-DES ALGO_SK_CAST5 = 3 # CAST5 ALGO_SK_BLOWFISH = 4 # Blowfish ALGO_SK_SAFER_SK128 = 5 # SAFER-SK128 ALGO_SK_DES_SK = 6 # DES/SK ALGO_SK_AES_128 = 7 # AES 128-bit ALGO_SK_AES_192 = 8 # AES 192-bit ALGO_SK_AES_256 = 9 # AES 256-bit ALGO_SK_TWOFISH_256 = 10 # Twofish 256 algo_sk_to_str = { ALGO_SK_PLAIN : 'Plaintext or unencrypted data', ALGO_SK_IDEA : 'IDEA', ALGO_SK_3DES : 'Triple-DES', ALGO_SK_CAST5 : 'CAST5', ALGO_SK_BLOWFISH : 'Blowfish', ALGO_SK_SAFER_SK128 : 'SAFER-SK128', ALGO_SK_DES_SK : 'DES/SK', ALGO_SK_AES_128 : 'AES 128-bit', ALGO_SK_AES_192 : 'AES 192-bit', ALGO_SK_AES_256 : 'AES 256-bit', ALGO_SK_TWOFISH_256 : 'Twofish 256-bit' } # Compression Algorithms ALGO_COMP_UNCOMP = 0 # Uncompressed ALGO_COMP_ZIP = 1 # ZIP ALGO_COMP_ZLIB = 2 # ZLIB ALGO_COMP_BZIP2 = 3 # BZip2 algo_comp_to_str = { ALGO_COMP_UNCOMP : 'Uncompressed', ALGO_COMP_ZIP : 'ZIP', ALGO_COMP_ZLIB : 'ZLIB', ALGO_COMP_BZIP2 : 'BZip2' } # Hash Algorithms ALGO_HASH_MD5 = 1 # MD5 ALGO_HASH_SHA1 = 2 # SHA1 ALGO_HASH_RIPEMD160 = 3 # RIPEMD160 ALGO_HASH_SHA_DBL = 4 # double-width SHA ALGO_HASH_MD2 = 5 # MD2 ALGO_HASH_TIGER192 = 6 # TIGER192 ALGO_HASH_HAVAL_5_160 = 7 # HAVAL-5-160 ALGO_HASH_SHA256 = 8 # SHA256 ALGO_HASH_SHA384 = 9 # SHA384 ALGO_HASH_SHA512 = 10 # SHA512 ALGO_HASH_SHA224 = 11 # SHA224 algo_hash_to_str = { ALGO_HASH_MD5 : 'MD5', ALGO_HASH_SHA1 : 'SHA1', ALGO_HASH_RIPEMD160 : 'RIPEMD160', ALGO_HASH_SHA_DBL : 'double-width SHA', ALGO_HASH_MD2 : 'MD2', ALGO_HASH_TIGER192 : 'TIGER192', ALGO_HASH_HAVAL_5_160 : 'HAVAL-5-160', ALGO_HASH_SHA256 : 'SHA256', ALGO_HASH_SHA384 : 'SHA384', ALGO_HASH_SHA512 : 'SHA512', ALGO_HASH_SHA224 : 'SHA224' } # Signature types SIG_TYPE_DOCUMENT = 0x00 # document signature, binary image SIG_TYPE_DOCUMENT_CANON = 0x01 # document signature, canonical text SIG_TYPE_STANDALONE = 0x02 # signature over just subpackets SIG_TYPE_PK_USER_GEN = 0x10 # public key packet and user ID packet, generic certification SIG_TYPE_PK_USER_PER = 0x11 # public key packet and user ID packet, persona SIG_TYPE_PK_USER_CAS = 0x12 # public key packet and user ID packet, casual certification SIG_TYPE_PK_USER_POS = 0x13 # public key packet and user ID packet, positive certification SIG_TYPE_SUBKEY_BIND = 0x18 # subkey binding SIG_TYPE_KEY = 0x1F # key signature SIG_TYPE_KEY_REVOKE = 0x20 # key revocation SIG_TYPE_SUBKEY_REVOKE = 0x28 # subkey revocation SIG_TYPE_CERT_REVOKE = 0x30 # certificate revocation SIG_TYPE_TIMESTAMP = 0x40 # timestamp sig_type_to_str = { SIG_TYPE_DOCUMENT : 'document signature, binary image', SIG_TYPE_DOCUMENT_CANON : 'document signature, canonical text', SIG_TYPE_STANDALONE : 'signature over just subpackets', SIG_TYPE_PK_USER_GEN : 'public key packet and user ID packet, generic certification', SIG_TYPE_PK_USER_PER : 'public key packet and user ID packet, persona', SIG_TYPE_PK_USER_CAS : 'public key packet and user ID packet, casual certification', SIG_TYPE_PK_USER_POS : 'public key packet and user ID packet, positive certification', SIG_TYPE_SUBKEY_BIND : 'subkey binding', SIG_TYPE_KEY : 'key signature', SIG_TYPE_KEY_REVOKE : 'key revocation', SIG_TYPE_SUBKEY_REVOKE : 'subkey revocation', SIG_TYPE_CERT_REVOKE : 'certificate revocation', SIG_TYPE_TIMESTAMP : 'timestamp' } # Signature sub-packet types SIG_SUB_TYPE_CREATE_TIME = 2 # signature creation time SIG_SUB_TYPE_EXPIRE_TIME = 3 # signature expiration time SIG_SUB_TYPE_EXPORT_CERT = 4 # exportable certification SIG_SUB_TYPE_TRUST_SIG = 5 # trust signature SIG_SUB_TYPE_REGEXP = 6 # regular expression SIG_SUB_TYPE_REVOCABLE = 7 # revocable SIG_SUB_TYPE_KEY_EXPIRE = 9 # key expiration time SIG_SUB_TYPE_PLACEHOLDER = 10 # placeholder for backward compatibility SIG_SUB_TYPE_PREF_SYMM_ALGO = 11 # preferred symmetric algorithms SIG_SUB_TYPE_REVOKE_KEY = 12 # revocation key SIG_SUB_TYPE_ISSUER_KEY_ID = 16 # issuer key ID SIG_SUB_TYPE_NOTATION = 20 # notation data SIG_SUB_TYPE_PREF_HASH_ALGO = 21 # preferred hash algorithms SIG_SUB_TYPE_PREF_COMP_ALGO = 22 # preferred compression algorithms SIG_SUB_TYPE_KEY_SRV_PREF = 23 # key server preferences SIG_SUB_TYPE_PREF_KEY_SRVR = 24 # preferred key server SIG_SUB_TYPE_PRIM_USER_ID = 25 # primary user id SIG_SUB_TYPE_POLICY_URI = 26 # policy URI SIG_SUB_TYPE_KEY_FLAGS = 27 # key flags SIG_SUB_TYPE_SGNR_USER_ID = 28 # signer's user id SIG_SUB_TYPE_REVOKE_REASON = 29 # reason for revocation SIG_SUB_TYPE_FEATURES = 30 # features SIG_SUB_TYPE_SIG_TARGET = 31 # signature target SIG_SUB_TYPE_EMBEDDED_SIG = 32 # embedded signature sig_sub_type_to_str = { SIG_SUB_TYPE_CREATE_TIME : 'signature creation time', SIG_SUB_TYPE_EXPIRE_TIME : 'signature expiration time', SIG_SUB_TYPE_EXPORT_CERT : 'exportable certification', SIG_SUB_TYPE_TRUST_SIG : 'trust signature', SIG_SUB_TYPE_REGEXP : 'regular expression', SIG_SUB_TYPE_REVOCABLE : 'revocable', SIG_SUB_TYPE_KEY_EXPIRE : 'key expiration time', SIG_SUB_TYPE_PLACEHOLDER : 'placeholder for backward compatibility', SIG_SUB_TYPE_PREF_SYMM_ALGO : 'preferred symmetric algorithms', SIG_SUB_TYPE_REVOKE_KEY : 'revocation key', SIG_SUB_TYPE_ISSUER_KEY_ID : 'issuer key ID', SIG_SUB_TYPE_NOTATION : 'notation data', SIG_SUB_TYPE_PREF_HASH_ALGO : 'preferred hash algorithms', SIG_SUB_TYPE_PREF_COMP_ALGO : 'preferred compression algorithms', SIG_SUB_TYPE_KEY_SRV_PREF : 'key server preferences', SIG_SUB_TYPE_PREF_KEY_SRVR : 'preferred key server', SIG_SUB_TYPE_PRIM_USER_ID : 'primary user id', SIG_SUB_TYPE_POLICY_URI : 'policy URI', SIG_SUB_TYPE_KEY_FLAGS : 'key flags', SIG_SUB_TYPE_SGNR_USER_ID : "signer's user id", SIG_SUB_TYPE_REVOKE_REASON : 'reason for revocation', SIG_SUB_TYPE_FEATURES : 'features', SIG_SUB_TYPE_SIG_TARGET : 'signature target', SIG_SUB_TYPE_EMBEDDED_SIG : 'embedded signature' } # in a signature subpacket there may be a revocation reason, these codes indicate # the reason REVOKE_REASON_NONE = 0 # No reason specified REVOKE_REASON_SUPER = 0x01 # Key is superceded REVOKE_REASON_COMPR = 0x02 # Key has been compromised REVOKE_REASON_NOT_USED = 0x03 # Key is no longer used REVOKE_REASON_ID_INVALID = 0x20 # user id information is no longer valid revoke_reason_to_str = { REVOKE_REASON_NONE : 'No reason specified', REVOKE_REASON_SUPER : 'Key is superceded', REVOKE_REASON_COMPR : 'Key has been compromised', REVOKE_REASON_NOT_USED : 'Key is no longer used', REVOKE_REASON_ID_INVALID : 'user id information is no longer valid' } # These flags are used in a 'key flags' signature subpacket KEY_FLAGS1_MAY_CERTIFY = 0x01 # This key may be used to certify other keys KEY_FLAGS1_MAY_SIGN = 0x02 # This key may be used to sign data KEY_FLAGS1_MAY_ENC_COMM = 0x04 # This key may be used to encrypt communications KEY_FLAGS1_MAY_ENC_STRG = 0x08 # This key may be used to encrypt storage KEY_FLAGS1_PRIV_MAYBE_SPLIT = 0x10 # Private component have be split through secret-sharing mech. KEY_FLAGS1_GROUP = 0x80 # Private component may be among group # A revocation key subpacket has these class values REVOKE_KEY_CLASS_MAND = 0x80 # this bit must always be set REVOKE_KEY_CLASS_SENS = 0x40 # sensitive # Features may be indicated in a signature hashed subpacket PGP_FEATURE_1_MOD_DETECT = 0x01 # Modification detection pgp_feature_to_str = { PGP_FEATURE_1_MOD_DETECT : 'Modification Detection' } def get_whole_number(msg, idx, numlen) : """get_whole_number(msg, idx, numlen) extracts a "whole number" field of length numlen from msg at index idx returns (<whole number>, new_idx) where the whole number is a long integer and new_idx is the index of the next element in the message""" n = 0L while numlen > 0 : b = (struct.unpack("B", msg[idx:idx+1]))[0] n = n * 256L + long(b) idx = idx + 1 numlen = numlen - 1 return (n, idx) def get_whole_int(msg, idx, numlen) : """get_whole_int(msg, idx, numlen) same as get_whole_number but returns the number as an int for convenience""" n, idx = get_whole_number(msg, idx, numlen) return int(n), idx def pack_long(l) : """pack_long(l) returns big-endian representation of unsigned long integer""" arr = [] while l > 0 : arr.insert(0, struct.pack("B", l & 0xff)) l >>= 8 return ''.join(arr) def pack_mpi(l) : """pack_mpi(l) returns the PGP Multi-Precision Integer representation of unsigned long integer""" s = pack_long(l) # the len is the number of bits, counting only from the MSB, # so we need to account for that bits = (len(s) - 1) * 8 if len(s) > 0 : n = ord(s[0]) while n != 0 : bits += 1 n >>= 1 else : bits = 0 # otherwise bits == -8 return struct.pack(">H", bits) + s def get_sig_subpak_len(msg, idx) : """get_sig_subpak_len(msg, idx) extracts a signature subpacket length field returns (subpak_len, new_idx)""" plen, idx = get_whole_int(msg, idx, 1) if plen < 192 : return plen, idx if plen < 255 : plen2, idx = get_whole_int(msg, idx, 1) return ((plen - 192) << 8) + plen2 + 192, idx return get_whole_int(msg, idx, 4) def get_n_mpi(msg, idx) : """get_mpi(msg, idx) extracts a multi-precision integer field from the message msg at index idx returns (n, <mpi>, new_idx) where the mpi is a long integer and new_idx is the index of the next element in the message and n is the number of bits of precision in <mpi>""" ln, idx = get_whole_int(msg, idx, 2) return (ln,) + get_whole_number(msg, idx, (ln+7)/8) def get_mpi(msg, idx) : """get_mpi(msg, idx) extracts a multi-precision integer field from the message msg at index idx returns (<mpi>, new_idx) where the mpi is a long integer and new_idx is the index of the next element in the message""" l = get_n_mpi(msg, idx) return (l[1], l[2]) def str_to_hex(s) : return ''.join(map(lambda x : hex(ord(x))[2:].zfill(2), list(s))) def duration_to_str(s) : if s == 0 : return 'never' secs = s % 60 s = s / 60 mins = s % 60 s = s / 60 hrs = s % 60 s = s / 24 days = s return '%d days %02d:%02d:%02d' % (days, hrs, mins, secs) def map_to_str(m, vals) : slist = [] # change to a list if it's a single value if type(vals) != types.ListType and type(vals) != types.TupleType : vals = list((vals,)) for i in vals : if i in m : slist.append(m[i]) else : slist.append('unknown(' + str(i) + ')') return ', '.join(slist) class pgp_packet(object) : def __init__(self) : self.pkt_typ = None def __str__(self) : return map_to_str(ctb_pkt_to_str, self.pkt_typ) class public_key(pgp_packet) : def __init__(self) : pgp_packet.__init__(self) self.version = None self.pk_algo = None self.key_size = 0 self.fingerprint_ = None # we cache this upon calculation def fingerprint(self) : # return cached value if we have it if self.fingerprint_ : return self.fingerprint_ # otherwise calculate it now and cache it # v3 and v4 are calculated differently if self.version == 3 : h = hashlib.new('md5') h.update(pack_long(self.pk_rsa_mod)) h.update(pack_long(self.pk_rsa_exp)) self.fingerprint_ = h.digest() elif self.version == 4 : # we hash what would be the whole PGP message containing # the pgp certificate h = hashlib.new('sha1') h.update('\x99') # we need to has the length of the packet as well buf = self.serialize() h.update(struct.pack(">H", len(buf))) h.update(buf) self.fingerprint_ = h.digest() else : raise RuntimeError("unknown public key version %d" % self.version) return self.fingerprint_ def key_id(self) : if self.version == 3 : return pack_long(self.pk_rsa_mod & 0xffffffffffffffffL) elif self.version == 4 : return self.fingerprint()[-8:] def serialize(self) : chunks = [] if self.version == 3 : chunks.append(struct.pack('>BIHB', self.version, int(self.timestamp), self.validity, self.pk_algo)) chunks.append(pack_mpi(self.pk_rsa_mod)) chunks.append(pack_mpi(self.pk_rsa_exp)) elif self.version == 4 : chunks.append(struct.pack('>BIB', self.version, int(self.timestamp), self.pk_algo)) if self.pk_algo == ALGO_PK_RSA_ENC_OR_SIGN or self.pk_algo == ALGO_PK_RSA_SIGN_ONLY : chunks.append(pack_mpi(self.pk_rsa_mod)) chunks.append(pack_mpi(self.pk_rsa_exp)) elif self.pk_algo == ALGO_PK_DSA : chunks.append(pack_mpi(self.pk_dsa_prime_p)) chunks.append(pack_mpi(self.pk_dsa_grp_ord_q)) chunks.append(pack_mpi(self.pk_dsa_grp_gen_g)) chunks.append(pack_mpi(self.pk_dsa_pub_key)) elif self.pk_algo == ALGO_PK_ELGAMAL_ENC_OR_SIGN or self.pk_algo == ALGO_PK_ELGAMAL_ENC_ONLY : chunks.append(pack_mpi(self.pk_elgamal_prime_p)) chunks.append(pack_mpi(self.pk_elgamal_grp_gen_g)) chunks.append(pack_mpi(self.pk_elgamal_pub_key)) else : raise RuntimeError("unknown public key algorithm %d" % (self.pk_algo)) return ''.join(chunks) def deserialize(self, msg, idx, pkt_len) : idx_save = idx self.version, idx = get_whole_int(msg, idx, 1) if self.version != 2 and self.version != 3 and self.version != 4 : raise RuntimeError('unknown public key packet version %d at %d' % (self.version, idx_save)) if self.version == 2 : # map v2 into v3 for coding simplicity since they're structurally the same self.version = 3 self.timestamp, idx = get_whole_number(msg, idx, 4) self.timestamp = float(self.timestamp) if self.version == 3 : self.validity, idx = get_whole_number(msg, idx, 2) self.pk_algo, idx = get_whole_int(msg, idx, 1) if self.pk_algo == ALGO_PK_RSA_ENC_OR_SIGN or self.pk_algo == ALGO_PK_RSA_SIGN_ONLY : self.key_size, self.pk_rsa_mod, idx = get_n_mpi(msg, idx) self.pk_rsa_exp, idx = get_mpi(msg, idx) elif self.pk_algo == ALGO_PK_DSA : l1, self.pk_dsa_prime_p, idx = get_n_mpi(msg, idx) self.pk_dsa_grp_ord_q, idx = get_mpi(msg, idx) self.pk_dsa_grp_gen_g, idx = get_mpi(msg, idx) l2, self.pk_dsa_pub_key, idx = get_n_mpi(msg, idx) self.key_size = l1 + l2 elif self.pk_algo == ALGO_PK_ELGAMAL_ENC_OR_SIGN or self.pk_algo == ALGO_PK_ELGAMAL_ENC_ONLY : self.key_size, self.pk_elgamal_prime_p, idx = get_n_mpi(msg, idx) self.pk_elgamal_grp_gen_g, idx = get_mpi(msg, idx) self.pk_elgamal_pub_key, idx = get_mpi(msg, idx) else : raise RuntimeError("unknown public key algorithm %d at %d" % (self.pk_algo, idx_save)) def __str__(self) : sio = cStringIO.StringIO() sio.write(pgp_packet.__str__(self) + "\n") sio.write("version: " + str(self.version) + "\n") sio.write("timestamp: " + time.ctime(self.timestamp) + "\n") if self.version == 3 : sio.write("validity: " + time.ctime(self.timestamp + self.validity * 24 * 60 * 60) + "\n") sio.write("pubkey algo: " + algo_pk_to_str[self.pk_algo] + "\n") if self.pk_algo == ALGO_PK_RSA_ENC_OR_SIGN or self.pk_algo == ALGO_PK_RSA_SIGN_ONLY : sio.write("pk_rsa_mod: " + hex(self.pk_rsa_mod) + "\n") sio.write("pk_rsa_exp: " + hex(self.pk_rsa_exp) + "\n") elif self.pk_algo == ALGO_PK_DSA : sio.write("pk_dsa_prime_p: " + hex(self.pk_dsa_prime_p) + "\n") sio.write("pk_dsa_grp_ord_q: " + hex(self.pk_dsa_grp_ord_q) + "\n") sio.write("pk_dsa_grp_gen_g: " + hex(self.pk_dsa_grp_gen_g) + "\n") sio.write("pk_dsa_pub_key: " + hex(self.pk_dsa_pub_key) + "\n") elif self.pk_algo == ALGO_PK_ELGAMAL_ENC_OR_SIGN or self.pk_algo == ALGO_PK_ELGAMAL_ENC_ONLY : sio.write("pk_elgamal_prime_p: " + hex(self.pk_elgamal_prime_p) + "\n") sio.write("pk_elgamal_grp_gen_g: " + hex(self.pk_elgamal_grp_gen_g) + "\n") sio.write("pk_elgamal_pub_key: " + hex(self.pk_elgamal_pub_key) + "\n") return sio.getvalue() class user_id(pgp_packet) : def __init__(self) : pgp_packet.__init__(self) self.id = None def deserialize(self, msg, idx, pkt_len) : self.id = msg[idx:idx + pkt_len] def __str__(self) : return pgp_packet.__str__(self) + "\n" + "id: " + self.id + "\n" class user_attribute(pgp_packet) : def __init__(self) : pgp_packet.__init__(self) self.sub_type = None self.data = None def deserialize(self, msg, idx, pkt_len) : self.sub_type, idx = get_whole_int(msg, idx, 1) pkt_len = pkt_len - 1 self.data = msg[idx:idx + pkt_len] def __str__(self) : return pgp_packet.__str__(self) + "\n" + "sub_type: " + str(self.sub_type) + "\ndata: " + str_to_hex(self.data) class signature(pgp_packet) : def __init__(self) : pgp_packet.__init__(self) self.version = None self.sig_type = None self.pk_algo = None self.hash_algo = None self.hash_frag = None def key_id(self) : if self.version == 3 : return self.key_id_ else : i = self.get_hashed_subpak(SIG_SUB_TYPE_ISSUER_KEY_ID) if i : return i[1] i = self.get_unhashed_subpak(SIG_SUB_TYPE_ISSUER_KEY_ID) if i : return i[1] return None def creation_time(self) : if self.version == 3 : return self.timestamp else : i = self.get_hashed_subpak(SIG_SUB_TYPE_CREATE_TIME) return i[1] def expiration(self) : if self.version != 4 : raise ValueError('v3 signatures don\'t have expirations') i = self.get_hashed_subpak(SIG_SUB_TYPE_KEY_EXPIRE) if i : return i[1] return 0 # if not present then it never expires def get_hashed_subpak(self, typ) : for i in self.hashed_subpaks : if i[0] == typ : return i return None def get_unhashed_subpak(self, typ) : for i in self.unhashed_subpaks : if i[0] == typ : return i return None def deserialize_subpacket(self, msg, idx) : sublen, idx = get_sig_subpak_len(msg, idx) subtype, idx = get_whole_int(msg, idx, 1) if subtype == SIG_SUB_TYPE_CREATE_TIME : # key creation time tm, idx = get_whole_number(msg, idx, 4) return (subtype, float(tm)), idx if subtype == SIG_SUB_TYPE_EXPIRE_TIME or subtype == SIG_SUB_TYPE_KEY_EXPIRE : s, idx = get_whole_int(msg, idx, 4) return (subtype, s), idx if subtype == SIG_SUB_TYPE_EXPORT_CERT or subtype == SIG_SUB_TYPE_REVOCABLE : bool, idx = get_whole_int(msg, idx, 1) return (subtype, bool), idx if subtype == SIG_SUB_TYPE_TRUST_SIG : # trust signature trust_lvl, idx = get_whole_int(msg, idx, 1) trust_amt, idx = get_whole_int(msg, idx, 1) return (subtype, trust_lvl, trust_amt), idx if subtype == SIG_SUB_TYPE_REGEXP : # regular expression expr = msg[idx:idx+sublen-1] idx = idx + sublen - 1 return (subtype, expr), idx if subtype == SIG_SUB_TYPE_PREF_SYMM_ALGO or subtype == SIG_SUB_TYPE_PREF_HASH_ALGO or subtype == SIG_SUB_TYPE_PREF_COMP_ALGO or subtype == SIG_SUB_TYPE_KEY_FLAGS : algo_list = map(lambda x : ord(x), list(msg[idx:idx+sublen-1])) idx = idx + sublen - 1 return (subtype, algo_list), idx if subtype == SIG_SUB_TYPE_REVOKE_KEY : # revocation key cls, idx = get_whole_int(msg, idx, 1) algo, idx = get_whole_int(msg, idx, 1) fprint = msg[idx:idx+20] idx = idx + 20 return (subtype, cls, algo, fprint), idx if subtype == SIG_SUB_TYPE_ISSUER_KEY_ID : # issuer key ID k_id = msg[idx:idx+8] idx = idx + 8 return (subtype, k_id), idx if subtype == SIG_SUB_TYPE_NOTATION : # notation data flg1, idx = get_whole_int(msg, idx, 1) flg2, idx = get_whole_int(msg, idx, 1) flg3, idx = get_whole_int(msg, idx, 1) flg4, idx = get_whole_int(msg, idx, 1) name_len, idx = get_whole_int(msg, idx, 2) val_len, idx = get_whole_int(msg, idx, 2) nam = msg[idx:idx+name_len] idx = idx + name_len val = msg[idx:idx+val_len] idx = idx + val_len return (subtype, flg1, flg2, flg3, flg4, nam, val), idx if subtype == SIG_SUB_TYPE_KEY_SRV_PREF : # key server preferences prefs = [ ord(x) for x in msg[idx:idx+sublen-1] ] idx = idx + sublen - 1 return (subtype, prefs), idx if subtype == SIG_SUB_TYPE_PREF_KEY_SRVR : # preferred key server url = msg[idx:idx+sublen-1] idx = idx + sublen - 1 return (subtype, url), idx if subtype == SIG_SUB_TYPE_PRIM_USER_ID : # primary user id bool, idx = get_whole_int(msg, idx, 1) return (subtype, bool), idx if subtype == SIG_SUB_TYPE_POLICY_URI : # policy URI uri = msg[idx:idx+sublen-1] idx = idx + sublen - 1 return (subtype, uri), idx if subtype == SIG_SUB_TYPE_SGNR_USER_ID : # signer's user id signer_id = msg[idx:idx+sublen-1] idx = idx + sublen - 1 return (subtype, signer_id), idx if subtype == SIG_SUB_TYPE_REVOKE_REASON : # reason for revocation rev_code, idx = get_whole_int(msg, idx, 1) reas_len = sublen - 2 reas = msg[idx:idx+reas_len] idx = idx + reas_len return (subtype, rev_code, reas), idx if subtype == SIG_SUB_TYPE_FEATURES : # features sublen = sublen - 1 l = [subtype] while sublen > 0 : oct, idx = get_whole_int(msg, idx, 1) l.append(oct) sublen = sublen - 1 return tuple(l), idx if subtype == SIG_SUB_TYPE_SIG_TARGET : # signature target public_key_algo, idx = get_whole_int(msg, idx, 1) hash_algo, idx = get_whole_int(msg, idx, 1) hash = msg[idx:idx+sublen-3] idx = idx + sublen - 3 return (subtype, public_key_algo, hash_algo, hash), idx if subtype == SIG_SUB_TYPE_EMBEDDED_SIG : # embedded signature # don't do anything fancy, just the raw bits dat = msg[idx:idx+sublen-1] idx = idx + sublen - 1 return (subtype, dat), idx # otherwise the subpacket is an unknown type, so we just pack the data in it dat = msg[idx:idx+sublen-1] idx = idx + sublen - 1 return (subtype, dat), idx def is_primary_user_id(self) : """is_primary_user_id() returns true if this signature contains a primary user id subpacket with value true""" for i in self.hashed_subpaks : if i[0] == SIG_SUB_TYPE_PRIM_USER_ID : return i[1] return 0 def subpacket_to_str(self, sp) : if sp[0] == SIG_SUB_TYPE_CREATE_TIME : # signature creation time return 'creation time: ' + time.ctime(sp[1]) if sp[0] == SIG_SUB_TYPE_EXPIRE_TIME : # signature expiration time return 'signature expires: ' + duration_to_str(sp[1]) if sp[0] == SIG_SUB_TYPE_EXPORT_CERT : # exportable certification if sp[1] : return 'signature exportable: TRUE' else : return 'signature exportable: FALSE' if sp[0] == SIG_SUB_TYPE_TRUST_SIG : # trust signature if sp[1] == 0 : return 'trust: ordinary' if sp[1] == 1 : return 'trust: introducer (%d)' % sp[2] if sp[1] == 2 : return 'trust: meta-introducer (%d)' % sp[2] return 'trust: %d %d' % (sp[1], sp[2]) if sp[0] == SIG_SUB_TYPE_REGEXP : # regular expression return 'regexp: ' + sp[1] if sp[0] == SIG_SUB_TYPE_REVOCABLE : # revocable if sp[1] : return 'signature revocable: TRUE' else : return 'signature revocable: FALSE' if sp[0] == SIG_SUB_TYPE_KEY_EXPIRE : # key expiration time return 'key expires: ' + duration_to_str(sp[1]) if sp[0] == SIG_SUB_TYPE_PREF_SYMM_ALGO : # preferred symmetric algorithms return 'preferred symmetric algorithms: ' + map_to_str(algo_sk_to_str, sp[1]) if sp[0] == SIG_SUB_TYPE_REVOKE_KEY : # revocation key s = 'revocation key: ' if sp[1] & REVOKE_KEY_CLASS_SENS : s = s + '(sensitive) ' return s + map_to_str(algo_pk_to_str, sp[2]) + ' ' + str_to_hex(sp[3]) if sp[0] == SIG_SUB_TYPE_ISSUER_KEY_ID : # issuer key ID return 'issuer key id: ' + str_to_hex(sp[1]) if sp[0] == SIG_SUB_TYPE_NOTATION : # notation data return 'notation: flags(%d, %d, %d, %d) name(%s) value(%s)' % sp[1:] if sp[0] == SIG_SUB_TYPE_PREF_HASH_ALGO : # preferred hash algorithms return 'preferred hash algorithms: ' + map_to_str(algo_hash_to_str, sp[1]) if sp[0] == SIG_SUB_TYPE_PREF_COMP_ALGO : # preferred compression algorithms return 'preferred compression algorithms: ' + map_to_str(algo_comp_to_str, sp[1]) if sp[0] == SIG_SUB_TYPE_KEY_SRV_PREF : # key server preferences s = 'key server preferences: ' prefs = [] if sp[1][0] & 0x80 : prefs.append('No-modify') return s + ', '.join(prefs) if sp[0] == SIG_SUB_TYPE_PREF_KEY_SRVR : # preferred key server return 'preferred key server: %s' % sp[1] if sp[0] == SIG_SUB_TYPE_PRIM_USER_ID : # primary user id if sp[1] : return 'is primary user id' else : return 'is not primary user id' if sp[0] == SIG_SUB_TYPE_POLICY_URI : # policy URL return 'policy url: %s' % sp[1] if sp[0] == SIG_SUB_TYPE_KEY_FLAGS : # key flags flags = [] flgs1 = 0 if len(sp[1]) >= 1 : flgs1 = sp[1][0] if flgs1 & KEY_FLAGS1_MAY_CERTIFY : flags.append('may certify other keys') if flgs1 & KEY_FLAGS1_MAY_SIGN : flags.append('may sign data') if flgs1 & KEY_FLAGS1_MAY_ENC_COMM : flags.append('may encrypt communications') if flgs1 & KEY_FLAGS1_MAY_ENC_STRG : flags.append('may encrypt storage') if flgs1 & KEY_FLAGS1_PRIV_MAYBE_SPLIT : flags.append('private component may have been secret-sharing split') if flgs1 & KEY_FLAGS1_GROUP : flags.append('group key') return 'key flags: ' + ', '.join(flags) if sp[0] == SIG_SUB_TYPE_SGNR_USER_ID : # signer's user id return 'signer id: ' + sp[1] if sp[0] == SIG_SUB_TYPE_REVOKE_REASON : # reason for revocation reas = revoke_reason_to_str.get(sp[1], '') return 'reason for revocation: %s, %s' % (reas, sp[2]) if sp[0] == SIG_SUB_TYPE_FEATURES : # features features = [] if len(sp) > 1 : val = sp[1] if val & PGP_FEATURE_1_MOD_DETECT : features.append('Modification Detection') val = val & ~PGP_FEATURE_1_MOD_DETECT if val != 0 : features.append('[0]=0x%x' % val) for i in range(2, len(sp)) : features.append('[%d]=0x%x' % (i-1,sp[i])) return 'features: ' + ', '.join(features) # this means we don't know what the thing is so we just have raw data return 'unknown(%d): %s' % (sp[0], str_to_hex(sp[1])) def deserialize(self, msg, idx, pkt_len) : self.version, idx = get_whole_int(msg, idx, 1) if self.version == 2 : self.version = 3 if self.version == 3 : hash_len, idx = get_whole_number(msg, idx, 1) self.sig_type, idx = get_whole_int(msg, idx, 1) self.timestamp, idx = get_whole_number(msg, idx, 4) self.timestamp = float(self.timestamp) self.key_id_ = msg[idx:idx+8] idx = idx + 8 self.pk_algo, idx = get_whole_int(msg, idx, 1) self.hash_algo, idx = get_whole_int(msg, idx, 1) elif self.version == 4: self.sig_type, idx = get_whole_int(msg, idx, 1) self.pk_algo, idx = get_whole_int(msg, idx, 1) self.hash_algo, idx = get_whole_int(msg, idx, 1) sub_paks_len, idx = get_whole_int(msg, idx, 2) sub_paks_end = idx + sub_paks_len self.hashed_subpaks = [] while idx < sub_paks_end : sp, idx = self.deserialize_subpacket(msg, idx) self.hashed_subpaks.append(sp) sub_paks_len, idx = get_whole_int(msg, idx, 2) sub_paks_end = idx + sub_paks_len self.unhashed_subpaks = [] while idx < sub_paks_end : sp, idx = self.deserialize_subpacket(msg, idx) self.unhashed_subpaks.append(sp) else : raise RuntimeError('unknown signature packet version %d at %d' % (self.version, idx)) self.hash_frag, idx = get_whole_number(msg, idx, 2) if self.pk_algo == ALGO_PK_RSA_ENC_OR_SIGN or self.pk_algo == ALGO_PK_RSA_SIGN_ONLY : self.rsa_sig, idx = get_mpi(msg, idx) elif self.pk_algo == ALGO_PK_DSA : self.dsa_sig_r, idx = get_mpi(msg, idx) self.dsa_sig_s, idx = get_mpi(msg, idx) else : raise RuntimeError('unknown public-key algorithm (%d) in signature at %d' % (self.pk_algo, idx)) return idx def __str__(self) : sio = cStringIO.StringIO() sio.write(pgp_packet.__str__(self) + "\n") sio.write("version: " + str(self.version) + "\n") sio.write("type: " + sig_type_to_str[self.sig_type] + "\n") if self.version == 3 : sio.write("timestamp: " + time.ctime(self.timestamp) + "\n") sio.write("key_id: " + str_to_hex(self.key_id_) + "\n") elif self.version == 4 : sio.write("hashed subpackets:\n") for i in self.hashed_subpaks : sio.write(" " + self.subpacket_to_str(i) + "\n") sio.write("unhashed subpackets:\n") for i in self.unhashed_subpaks : sio.write(" " + self.subpacket_to_str(i) + "\n") sio.write("hash_algo: " + algo_hash_to_str[self.hash_algo] + "\n") sio.write("hash_frag: " + hex(self.hash_frag) + "\n") if self.pk_algo == ALGO_PK_RSA_ENC_OR_SIGN or self.pk_algo == ALGO_PK_RSA_SIGN_ONLY : sio.write("pk_algo: RSA\n") sio.write("rsa_sig: " + hex(self.rsa_sig) + "\n") elif self.pk_algo == ALGO_PK_DSA : sio.write("pk_algo: DSA\n") sio.write("dsa_sig_r: " + hex(self.dsa_sig_r) + "\n") sio.write("dsa_sig_s: " + hex(self.dsa_sig_s) + "\n") return sio.getvalue() # # This class encapsulates an openpgp public "certificate", which is formed in a message as # a series of PGP packets of certain types in certain orders # class pgp_certificate(object): def __init__(self) : self.version = None self.public_key = None self.revocations = [] self.user_ids = [] self.primary_user_id = -1 # index of the primary user id def __str__(self) : sio = cStringIO.StringIO() sio.write("PGP Public Key Certificate v%d\n" % self.version) sio.write("Cert ID: %s\n" % str_to_hex(self.public_key.key_id())) sio.write("Primary ID: %s\n" % self.user_id) sio.write(str(self.public_key)) for uid in self.user_ids : sio.write(str(uid[0])) for sig in uid[1:] : sio.write(" " + str(sig)) if hasattr(self, 'user_attrs') : for uattr in self.user_attrs : sio.write(' ') sio.write(str(uattr[0])) for sig in uattr[1:] : sio.write(" " + str(sig)) return sio.getvalue() def get_user_id(self): # take the LAST one in the list, not first # they appear to be ordered FIFO from the key and that means if you # added a key later then it won't show the one you expect return self.user_ids[self.primary_user_id][0].id user_id = property(get_user_id) def expiration(self) : if self.version == 3 : if self.public_key.validity == 0 : return 0 return self.public_key.timestamp + self.public_key.validity * 24 * 60 * 60 else : # self.version == 4 # this is a bit more complex, we need to find the signature on the # key and get its expiration u_id = self.user_ids[0] for i in u_id[1:] : if i.sig_type == SIG_TYPE_PK_USER_GEN : exp = i.expiration() if exp == 0 : return 0 return self.public_key.timestamp + exp return 0 def key_size(self) : return 0 def load(self, pkts) : """load(pkts) Initialize the pgp_certificate with a list of OpenPGP packets. The list of packets will be scanned to make sure they are valid for a pgp certificate.""" # each certificate should begin with a public key packet if pkts[0].pkt_typ != CTB_PKT_PK_CERT : raise ValueError('first PGP packet should be a public-key packet, not %s' % map_to_str(ctb_pkt_to_str, pkts[0].pkt_typ)) # all versions have a public key although in a v4 cert the main key is only # used for signing, never encryption self.public_key = pkts[0] # ok, then what's the version self.version = self.public_key.version # now the behavior splits a little depending on the version if self.version == 3 : pkt_idx = 1 # zero or more revocations while pkts[pkt_idx].pkt_typ == CTB_PKT_SIG : if pkts[pkt_idx].version != 3 : raise ValueError('version 3 cert has version %d signature' % pkts[pkt_idx].version) if pkts[pkt_idx].sig_type != SIG_TYPE_KEY_REVOKE : raise ValueError('v3 cert revocation sig has type %s' % map_to_str(sig_type_to_str, pkts[pkt_idx].sig_type)) # ok, well at least the type is good, we'll assume the cert is # revoked self.revocations.append(pkts[pkt_idx]) # increment the pkt_idx to go to the next one pkt_idx = pkt_idx + 1 # the following packets are User ID, Signature pairs while pkt_idx < len(pkts) : # this packet is supposed to be a user id if pkts[pkt_idx].pkt_typ != CTB_PKT_USER_ID : if len(self.user_ids) == 0 : raise ValueError('pgp packet %d is not user id, is %s' % (pkt_idx, map_to_str(ctb_pkt_to_str, pkts[pkt_idx].pkt_typ))) else : break user_id = [pkts[pkt_idx]] pkt_idx = pkt_idx + 1 is_revoked = 0 is_primary_user_id = 0 # there may be a sequence of signatures following the user id which # bind it to the key while pkt_idx < len(pkts) and pkts[pkt_idx].pkt_typ == CTB_PKT_SIG : if pkts[pkt_idx].sig_type not in (SIG_TYPE_PK_USER_GEN, SIG_TYPE_PK_USER_PER, SIG_TYPE_PK_USER_CAS, SIG_TYPE_PK_USER_POS, SIG_TYPE_CERT_REVOKE) : raise ValueError('signature %d doesn\'t bind user_id to key, is %s' % (pkt_idx, map_to_str(sig_type_to_str, pkts[pkt_idx].sig_type))) user_id.append(pkts[pkt_idx]) pkt_idx = pkt_idx + 1 # append the user ID and signature(s) onto a list self.user_ids.append(user_id) else : # self.version == 4 pkt_idx = 1 self.direct_key_sigs = [] self.subkeys = [] self.rvkd_subkeys = [] self.user_attrs = [] cert_id = self.public_key.key_id() # second packet could be a revocation (or a direct key self signature) while pkt_idx < len(pkts) and pkts[pkt_idx].pkt_typ == CTB_PKT_SIG : if pkts[pkt_idx].version != 4 : raise ValueError('version 4 cert has version %d signature' % pkts[pkt_idx].version) if pkts[pkt_idx].sig_type == SIG_TYPE_KEY_REVOKE : self.revocations.append(pkts[pkt_idx]) elif pkts[pkt_idx].sig_type == SIG_TYPE_KEY : self.direct_key_sigs.append(pkts[pkt_idx]) else : raise ValueError('v4 cert signature has type %s, supposed to be revocation signature or direct key signature' % map_to_str(sig_type_to_str, pkts[pkt_idx].sig_type)) # increment the pkt_idx to go to the next one pkt_idx = pkt_idx + 1 # the following packets are: # User ID, signature... sets or # subkey, signature... sets or # user attribute, signature... sets prim_user_id_sig_time = 0 while pkt_idx < len(pkts) : # this packet is supposed to be a user id if pkts[pkt_idx].pkt_typ == CTB_PKT_USER_ID : user_id = [pkts[pkt_idx]] is_revoked = 0 is_primary_user_id = 0 pkt_idx = pkt_idx + 1 # there may be a sequence of signatures following the user id which # bind it to the key while pkt_idx < len(pkts) and pkts[pkt_idx].pkt_typ == CTB_PKT_SIG : if pkts[pkt_idx].sig_type not in (SIG_TYPE_PK_USER_GEN, SIG_TYPE_PK_USER_PER, SIG_TYPE_PK_USER_CAS, SIG_TYPE_PK_USER_POS, SIG_TYPE_CERT_REVOKE) : raise ValueError('signature %d doesn\'t bind user_id to key, is %s' % (pkt_idx, map_to_str(sig_type_to_str, pkts[pkt_idx].sig_type))) user_id.append(pkts[pkt_idx]) # is this the primary user id? if pkts[pkt_idx].key_id() == cert_id : if pkts[pkt_idx].is_primary_user_id() : ct = pkts[pkt_idx].creation_time() if ct > prim_user_id_sig_time : self.primary_user_id = len(self.user_ids) prim_user_id_sig_time = ct pkt_idx = pkt_idx + 1 # append the user ID and signature(s) onto the list self.user_ids.append(user_id) # this packet is supposed to be a user id elif pkts[pkt_idx].pkt_typ == CTB_PKT_USER_ATTR : user_attr = [pkts[pkt_idx]] is_revoked = 0 pkt_idx = pkt_idx + 1 # there may be a sequence of signatures following the user id which # bind it to the key while pkt_idx < len(pkts) and pkts[pkt_idx].pkt_typ == CTB_PKT_SIG : if pkts[pkt_idx].sig_type not in (SIG_TYPE_PK_USER_GEN, SIG_TYPE_PK_USER_PER, SIG_TYPE_PK_USER_CAS, SIG_TYPE_PK_USER_POS, SIG_TYPE_CERT_REVOKE) : raise ValueError('signature %d doesn\'t bind user_attr to key, is %s' % (pkt_idx, map_to_str(sig_type_to_str, pkts[pkt_idx].sig_type))) user_attr.append(pkts[pkt_idx]) pkt_idx = pkt_idx + 1 # append the user ID and signature(s) onto the list self.user_attrs.append(user_attr) elif pkts[pkt_idx].pkt_typ == CTB_PKT_PK_SUB : # collect this list of subkey + signature [ + revocation ] subkey = [pkts[pkt_idx]] pkt_idx = pkt_idx + 1 is_revoked = 0 # there may optionally be a revocation if pkt_idx < len(pkts) and pkts[pkt_idx].pkt_typ == CTB_PKT_SIG and pkts[pkt_idx].sig_type == SIG_TYPE_SUBKEY_REVOKE : is_revoked = 1 subkey.append(pkts[pkt_idx]) pkt_idx = pkt_idx + 1 # there must be one signature following the subkey that binds it to the main key if pkt_idx >= len(pkts) : raise ValueError('subkey at index %d was not followed by a signature' % (pkt_idx-1)) if pkts[pkt_idx].pkt_typ != CTB_PKT_SIG or pkts[pkt_idx].sig_type != SIG_TYPE_SUBKEY_BIND : raise ValueError('signature %d doesn\'t bind subkey to key, type is %s' % (pkt_idx, map_to_str(sig_type_to_str, pkts[pkt_idx].sig_type))) subkey.append(pkts[pkt_idx]) pkt_idx = pkt_idx + 1 # append the user ID and signature(s) onto the list if is_revoked : self.rvkd_subkeys.append(subkey) else : self.subkeys.append(subkey) elif pkts[pkt_idx].pkt_typ == CTB_PKT_SIG : # ok, well at least the type is good, we'll assume the cert is # revoked self.revocations.append(pkts[pkt_idx]) # increment the pkt_idx to go to the next one pkt_idx = pkt_idx + 1 else : break # did we get all the things we needed? #if not self.user_id : # just take the first valid user id we encountered then if len(self.user_ids) == 0 : raise ValueError('no user id packet was present in the cert %s' % str_to_hex(self.public_key.key_id())) return pkt_idx def get_ctb(msg, idx) : """get_ctb(msg, idx) extracts a the "cypher type bit" information from message msg at index idx returns (type, len, new_idx) where type is the enumerated type of the packet, len is the length of the packet, and new_idx is the index of the next element in the message""" b, idx = get_whole_int(msg, idx, 1) if (b & CTB_76_MASK) == CTB_76_NORMAL : n_len = 0 # undefined length if (b & CTB_PKT_LEN_MASK) == CTB_PKT_LEN_1 : n_len = 1 if (b & CTB_PKT_LEN_MASK) == CTB_PKT_LEN_2 : n_len = 2 if (b & CTB_PKT_LEN_MASK) == CTB_PKT_LEN_4 : n_len = 4 if (b & CTB_PKT_LEN_MASK) == CTB_PKT_LEN_UNDEF : n_len = 0 pkt_len = 0 if n_len > 0 : pkt_len, idx = get_whole_int(msg, idx, n_len) return (b & CTB_PKTV2_MASK) >> 2, pkt_len, idx elif (b & CTB_76_MASK) == CTB_76_NEW : plen, idx = get_whole_int(msg, idx, 1) if plen < 192 : return b & CTB_PKT_MASK, plen, idx if plen < 224 : plen2, idx = get_whole_int(msg, idx, 1) return b & CTB_PKT_MASK, ((plen - 192) << 8) + plen2 + 192, idx if plen == 255 : plen, idx = get_whole_int(msg, idx, 4) return b & CTB_PKT_MASK, plen, idx else : raise Exception, 'partial message bodies are not supported by this version (%d)', b else : raise Exception, "unknown (not \"normal\") cypher type bit %d at byte %d" % (b, idx) def crc24(msg) : crc24_init = 0xb704ce crc24_poly = 0x1864cfb crc = crc24_init for i in list(msg) : crc = crc ^ (ord(i) << 16) for j in range(0, 8) : crc = crc << 1 if crc & 0x1000000 : crc = crc ^ crc24_poly return crc & 0xffffff def decode(msg) : # each message is a sequence of packets so we go through the message # and generate a list of packets and return that pkt_list = [] idx = 0 msg_len = len(msg) while idx < msg_len : pkt_typ, pkt_len, idx = get_ctb(msg, idx) pkt = None if pkt_typ == CTB_PKT_PK_CERT or pkt_typ == CTB_PKT_PK_SUB : pkt = public_key() elif pkt_typ == CTB_PKT_USER_ID : pkt = user_id() elif pkt_typ == CTB_PKT_SIG : pkt = signature() elif pkt_typ == CTB_PKT_USER_ATTR : pkt = user_attribute() if pkt : pkt.pkt_typ = pkt_typ pkt.deserialize(msg, idx, pkt_len) if debug : debug.write(pkt.__str__() + "\n") else : raise ValueError('unexpected pgp packet type %s at %d' % (map_to_str(ctb_pkt_to_str, pkt_typ), idx)) pkt_list.append(pkt) idx = idx + pkt_len return pkt_list def decode_msg(msg, multi=False) : """decode_msg(msg) ==> list of OpenPGP "packet" objects Takes an ascii-armored PGP block and returns a list of objects each of which corresponds to a PGP "packets". A PGP message is a series of packets. You need to understand how packets are to be combined together in order to know what to do with them. For example a PGP "certificate" includes a public key, user id(s), and signature. """ # first we'll break the block up into lines and trim each line of any # carriage return chars pgpkey_lines = map(lambda x : x.rstrip(), msg.split('\n')) # check out block in_block = 0 in_data = 0 block_buf = cStringIO.StringIO() for l in pgpkey_lines : if not in_block : if l == '-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----' : in_block = 1 continue # are we at the actual data yet? if not in_data : if len(l) == 0 : in_data = 1 continue # are we at the checksum line? if l and l[0] == '=' : # get the checksum number csum = base64.decodestring(l[1:5]) i = 0 csum, i = get_whole_number(csum, i, 3) # convert the base64 cert data to binary data cert_msg = base64.decodestring(block_buf.getvalue()) block_buf.close() # check the checksum if csum != crc24(cert_msg) : raise Exception, 'bad checksum on pgp message' # ok, the sum looks ok so we'll actually decode the thing pkt_list = decode(cert_msg) # turn it into a real cert cert_list = [] while len(pkt_list) > 0 : cert = pgp_certificate() cert.raw_key = msg pkt_idx = cert.load(pkt_list) cert_list.append(cert) pkt_list[0:pkt_idx] = [] if not multi: if not cert_list: return None return cert_list[0] return cert_list # add the data to our buffer then block_buf.write(l) if not multi: return None return [] def decode_multiple_keys(msg): #ditto of above - but handling multiple certs/keys per file certs = [] pgpkey_lines = map(lambda x : x.rstrip(), msg.split('\n')) in_block = 0 block = '' for l in pgpkey_lines : if not in_block : if l == '-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----' : in_block = 1 block += '%s\n' % l continue block += '%s\n' % l if l == '-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----': in_block = 0 thesecerts = decode_msg(block, multi=True) if thesecerts: certs.extend(thesecerts) block = '' continue return certs if __name__ == '__main__' : import sys for pgp_cert in decode_multiple_keys(open(sys.argv[1]).read()) : print pgp_cert